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Abstract
It has been argued by Shepard that there is a robust psychological law that relates the distance
between a pair of items in psychological space and the probability that they will be confused with
each other. Specifically, the probability of confusion is a negative exponential function of the distance
between the pair of items. In experimental contexts, distance is typically defined in terms of a multidi-
mensional Euclidean space—but this assumption seems unlikely to hold for complex stimuli. We show
that, nonetheless, the Universal Law of Generalization can be derived in the more complex setting of
arbitrary stimuli, using a much more universal measure of distance. This universal distance is defined
as the length of the shortest program that transforms the representations of the two items of interest
into one another: the algorithmic information distance. It is universal in the sense that it minorizes
every computable distance: it is the smallest computable distance. We show that the universal law of
generalization holds with probability going to one—provided the confusion probabilities are computable.
We also give a mathematically more appealing form of the universal law.
1 Introduction
Shepard [43] has put forward a “Universal Law of Generalization” as one of the few general psychological
results governing human cognition. The law states that the probability of confusing two items, a and b, is
a negative exponential function of the distance d(a, b) between them in an internal psychological Euclidean
space. A drawback of this approach may be that the Euclidean metric is one among many possible metrics
and may be appropriate in some cases but not in others. There exists, however, a universal cognitive metric
that accounts for all possible similarities that can intuitively be perceived. It assigns as small a distance
between two objects as any cognitive distance will do. Thus, while the positive and negative of the same
picture are far away from each other in terms of Euclidean distance, they are at almost zero distance in terms
of universal distance since interchanging the black and white pixels transforms one picture into the other.
The universal cognitive metric, also called “information distance”, is a mathematical notion resulting from
mathematical logic, computer science, information theory, and the theory of randomness. It is an “ideal”
notion in the sense that it ignores the limitations on processing capacity of the cognitive system. Nonetheless,
we show the following practical generalization of the universal law [of generalization]: if we randomly pick
items a and b, where we allow the most complex objects, then with overwhelming probability the universal
law of generalization holds with the internal psychological space metric being the information metric.
1.1 The Universal Law of Generalization
Although intended to have broader application, the law is primarily associated with a specific experimental
paradigm—the identification paradigm. In this paradigm, human or animal agents are repeatedly presented
with stimuli concerning a (typically small) number of items. We denote the items themselves as a, b, . . ., the
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corresponding stimuli as Sa, Sb, . . ., and the corresponding responses as Ra, Rb, . . .. The agents have to learn
to associate a specific, and distinct, response with each item—a response that can be viewed as “identifying”
the item concerned. The stimulus Sa is associated with item a and is supposed to evoke response Ra. With
some probability, stimulus Sa can evoke a response Rb with b 6= a. This means that item b is confused with
item a. The matrix of Pr(Ra|Sb) values is known as the confusability matrix. In these terms, the universal
law can be written as
Pr(Ra|Sb) is proportional to e
−d(a,b),
although we shall see below that the precise formulation is somewhat more complex. The law is not straight-
forward to test, because psychological distance d(·, ·) can only be inferred by indirect means. Moreover, even
for the simplest sets of stimuli, such as pure tones differing in frequency, the nature and even existence of the
corresponding internal psychological space, in terms of which distance can be defined, is highly controversial.
Shepard has, nonetheless, provided an impressive case for the universal law.
1.2 Shepard’s Case for the Universal Law
Shepard has argued that the technique of non-metric multidimensional scaling, of which he is a pioneer, can
be used to derive an underlying metric psychological space from the confusability data itself. Specifically,
the confusability data are used to derive a rank ordering of the distances between items on the basis of the
relations between corresponding stimuli and responses (imposing certain assumptions, for example, to ensure
that the “distance” between two points is symmetrical (that for all a, b, we have d(a, b) = d(b, a)). This rank
ordering is fed into a non-metric multidimensional scaling procedure, which aims to find a way of embedding
the items into a low dimensional Euclidean space. The goal is that the rank ordering of distances between
the points should correlate as well as possible with the rank ordering of confusabilities between items. The
underlying rationale for this procedure is that the embedding of the items in this low-dimensional Euclidean
space can be viewed as a model of the underlying psychological space used by the experimental participants.
Given that we have a model of the putative psychological space, and hence can measure the distance
d(a, b) between items in that space, we can assess whether the probability of confusion between a and b is
indeed inversely related to psychological distance, as predicted by the Universal Law.
Shepard has amassed a large and diverse body of empirical data that, when analysed in this way, are
consistent with the universal law. The diverse set of data that conforms to the law includes confusions
between linguistic phonemes[27], sizes of circles[25], and spectral hues, in both people[10] and pigeons[18].
This evidence builds an impressive case for the universal law. Shepard has, moreover, advanced a further line
of argument, that aims to provide a theoretical justification for the universal law. Although sympathetic to
this project of rational analysis [1, 8, 36], we will note in the Discussion that such justifications are actually
better understood as having a different target. Rather than focussing primarily on confusability, which is the
core content of the Universal Law, they focus on the much more difficult question of generalization from past
instances to future instances—a problem of inductive reasoning. We will therefore postpone consideration
of theoretical arguments in favour of the Universal Law.
1.3 The Universal Law: Weighing the Evidence
How far should we be convinced by the empirical case for the Universal Law? There are a number of points
at which the case might be challenged.
The first challenge concerns the ’universality’ of the Universal Law. There appear to be large numbers of
data sets [33, 34, 35] from identification paradigms for which confusability appears to be a Gaussian, rather
than a negative exponential, function of psychological distance:
Pr(Ra|Sb) is proportional to e
−d(a,b)2 .
Indeed, the Gaussian generalization function is so successful empirically that it is central to a widely-used
class of exemplar models [33, 26].
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The empirical picture is complex, but one plausible reconciliation of the Universal Law with apparent
examples of Gaussian confusability, is that the Gaussian confusability originates from problems of perceptu-
ally distinguishing the stimuli, whereas the Universal Law applies when perceptual discrimination is not the
limiting factor in performance. Ennis [11] provides a useful analysis of how perceptual noise might interact
with generalization in accordance with the Universal Law.
A further potential issue concerns the difficulties of curve-fitting. Comparing different classes of model
for fit with a set of data is a controversial and subtle matter and fits are frequently surprisingly inconclusive,
even when very large sets of data are available [30]. Moreover, Myung and Pitt [31] have recently argued
that comparisons between models are frequently systematically biassed because one class of models is less
restrictive than the other with respect to the class of data sets that it can model. This can lead to the
counterintuitive consequence that, using standard statistical methods, one may be likely to conclude that
the data were generated by model class A rather than B, irrespective of whether it was generated by model
class A or B. Fortunately, however, the exponential fares well from the point of view of Myung et al.s
analysis—at least in relation to the power law (which, in this context, would hold that
Pr(Ra|Sb) is proportional to d(a, b)
−c.
for some positive constant c.) which is a natural comparison. As far as we are aware, though, recent model
comparison techniques such as those suggested by Myung and Pitt have not been applied to confusability
data.
A further possible concern, which we have touched on above, is that pinning down the structure of internal
psychological spaces is a notoriously difficult matter, and one that can be tackled from a range of theoretical
perspectives, differing from that which Shepard adopts. Indeed, the problem of mapping magnitudes, such as
sound pressure, onto a one-dimensional internal sensory scale (perceived loudness) has occupied the attention
of psychophysicists for a century and a half without apparent resolution. Most famously, Fechner [14] argued
for a logarithmic relationship between physical intensity and internal magnitude, whereas Stevens [47] argued
for a power law relationship. Not all theorists will be confident in relying on non-metric multidimensional
scaling of confusability matrices as the solution to all these difficulties (see Falmagne, [13] for a review of
the complexities of this area).
Yet another concern is the assumption of symmetry which is inherent in the use of the mathematical
notion of metric to talk about the distance between two items a and b: d(a, b) = d(b, a). In psychological data
there seem to be genuine asymmetries across many ways of measuring confusability. For example, complex
things tend to be confused with simple things; but simple things are less often confused with complex things.
Thus, people misremember complex shapes as simple, wobbly street plans in terms of right angles, peculiar
and unusual colors in terms of ”focal” colours (e.g. “mauve” becomes “bright red”). This problem, however,
seems to be more related to rapidly blurring of complex details in memory, which erases complexity, rather
than an essential feature of the cognitive system. Here we simply assume symmetry of distance between two
items in psychological space.
A final concern, and the one which the present paper seeks to address, is that the view of psychological
distance as Euclidean distance in an internal multidimensional space may be too restrictive to be applicable
to many aspects of cognition. It is typically assumed that the cognitive representation formed of a visually
presented object, a sentence or a story, will involve structured representations (e.g., [3, 15, 16, 23, 28, 41, 51].
Structured representations can description an object not just as a set of features, or as a set of numerical
values along various dimensions, but in terms of parts and their interrelations, and properties that attach
to those parts. Thus, in describing a bird, it is important to specify not just the presence of a beak, eyes,
claws, and feathers, but the way in which they are spatially and functionally related to each other. Equally,
it is important to be able to specify that the beak is yellow, the claws orange and the features white—to
tie attributes to specific parts of an object. Thus, describing a bird, a line of Shakespeare, or the plot of
Hamlet as a point in a Euclidean multidimensional space appears to require using too weak a system of
representation.
This line of argument raises the possibility that the Universal Law may be restricted in scope to stimuli
which are sufficiently simple to have a simple multidimensional representation—perhaps those that have
no psychologically salient part-whole structure. We shall argue, however, that the Universal Law may
nonetheless be applicable quite generally, since all these aspects are taken into account by the algorithmic
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information theory approach. This leads to a more generalized form of the Universal Law, as well as to a
mathematically more appealing and less arbitrary form.
2 Mathematical Preliminaries
Shepard’s article raises the question whether psychological science has hope of formulating a law that is
comparable in scope and possibly accuracy to Newton’s universal law of gravitation. The universal law of
generalization for psychological science is an tentative candidate. In the Principia [32], Newton gives a few
rules governing scientific activity. The first rule is “We are to admit no more causes of natural things than
such as are both true and sufficient to explain the appearances. To this purpose the philosophers say that
Nature does nothing in vain, and more is in vain when less will serve; for Nature is pleased with simplicity,
and affects not the pomp of superfluous causes.” Here, we generalize the “universal law of generalization”
by essentially using Newton’s maxim.
We have noted that the empirical analysis of internal psychological spaces from experimental data has
proved extremely contentious. Here, we take a complementary approach and derive the universal law from
first principles using the novel notion of information contents of individual objects. That is, we motivate a
measure of distance between representations of objects on a priori grounds, drawing on recent advances in the
mathematical theory of Kolmogorov complexity [22]. It turns out that there is a very natural, and general,
measure of the “distance” between representations, of whatever form: the information distance. Using this
very general measure, the Universal Law of generalization still holds, subject to quite minimal restrictions on
the process by which the experimental participant maps stimuli onto responses in the identification paradigm.
The presentation of this section has three parts. First, we provide some general background and also
describe some basic results in Kolmogorov complexity theory. Second, we introduce and motivate the notion
of “information distance,” which we shall use as a fundamental measure of psychological distance. Third,
we consider the nature of the probabilitistic process by which the partipicant maps stimuli to responses,
which generates the confusion matrix in the identification paradigm—we shall need to make only very weak
assumptions about this probabilistic process. In the next section, we show that, given these notions, the
Universal Law holds: confusability is a negative exponential function of distance between representations.
2.1 Algorithmic Information Theory
We take the viewpoint that the set of objects we are interested is finite or infinite but countable, just like
the natural numbers. Each object can be described by using, for example English. That means we can
describe every object by a finite string in some fixed finite alphabet. By encoding the different letters of that
alphabet in bits (0’s and 1’s) we reduce every description or representation of the object to a finite binary
string. A similar argument presumably holds for the physical manner an object is represented in an agents
cognitive system. This way we reduce the representation of all objects that are relevant in this discussion to
finite binary strings. In the unlikely case that there are relevant objects that cannot be so represented we
simply agree that they are not subject of this discussion.
In the psychology and cognitive literature there have been a great number of proposals for encodings of
patterned sequences and defining the complexities of the resulting encodings. See for example the survey
in Simon [44]. All such encodings are special types of computable codes, which means that all of them can
be decoded by appropriate machines or programs. Mathematically one says that every such code can be
decoded by an appropriate Turing machine: a convenient model introduced in [49] to formally capture the
intuitive notion of “computation” in its greatest generality. It has turned out that all different mathematical
proposals to formulate a more general notion of computability after all turned out to be equivalent to the
Turing machine. Since then, the so-called Church-Turing thesis states that the Turing machine captures the
most universal and general notion of effective computability, and is the formal equivalent of our intuitive
notion of the same. It is universally used in formal arguments. There is no need to go into details here,
they can be found in any textbook on computable functions and effective processes, for example, [37] or a
section 1.7 in [22]. What is important here is that there is a general code that subsumes all computable
codes mentioned above. This is the code decodable by a so-called “universal” Turing machine. In effect,
such a machine works with a code book that enumerates all computable codes. By prefixing an encoded item
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with the index in the enumeration of the particular code that has been used, the universal Turing machine
can decode. Clearly, this universal encoding need not be longer than the shortest two-part code consisting
of the index of a particular code used plus the length of the resulting encoding. Stating that the universal
code can be decoded by a universal Turing machine is equivalent to that it is a program in a universal
programming language like C++ or Java. This leads to a notion of information content of an individual
object pioneered by the Russian mathematician A.N. Kolmogorov [21]. This notion should be contrasted
to Shannon’s statistical notion of information [42] which deals with the average number of bits required to
communicate a message from a probabilistic ensemble between a sender and a receiver. In this paper we
keep the discussion informal; an introduction, epistimology and rigorous treatment of the theory is given in
[22].
The Kolmogorov complexity K(x) of a finite object x, is defined as the length of the shortest binary
computer program that produces x as an output.1 Thus, objects such as a string of one billion ‘1’s or, a
binary code for a digitized picture of an untextured rectangle, or the first million digits of π = 3.1415 . . . are
reasonably simple, because there are short programs that can generate these objects. On the other hand, a
typical binary sequence generated by tossing a coin is complex—the sequence is its own shortest program,
because there is no hidden structure that can be used to find a shorter code. Kolmogorov complexity theory,
also known as algorithmic information theory, is a modern notion of randomness dealing with the quantity of
information in individual objects. The Kolmogorov complexity of an object is a form of absolute information
of the individual object, in contrast to standard (probabilistic) information theory [9] which is only concerned
with the average information of a random source.
The definition of Kolmogorov complexity may appear to be rather specific. But this appearance is
misleading. For example, The restriction to a binary coding alphabet can easily be dispensed with—switching
to an alphabet with n letters amounts merely to rescaling all Kolmogorov complexities by a multiplicative
constant,2 but has no other impact. The binary alphabet is used by convention, to provide a fixed measuring
standard. More interestingly, it might appear that the length of the shortest program that generates a
specific code must inevitably be relative to the choice of programming language. But a central result of
Kolmogorov complexity theory, the Invariance Theorem [22], states that the shortest description of any
object is invariant (up to a constant) between different universal languages. Therefore, it does not matter
whether the universal language chosen is C++, Java or Prolog—the length of the shortest description for
each object will be approximately the same. Let us introduce the notation KC++(x) to denote the length of
the shortest C++ program which generates object x; and KJava(x) to denote the length of the shortest Java
program. The Invariance Theorem implies that KC++(x) and KJava(x) will only differ by some constant,
c, (which may be positive or negative) for all objects x, including, of course, all possible perceptual stimuli.
Formally, there exists a constant c such that for all objects x:
|KC++(x) −KJava(x)| ≤ c.
Thus, in specifying the complexity of an object, it is therefore possible to abstract away from the particular
language under consideration. Thus the complexity of an object, x, can be denoted simply asK(x)—referring
to the Kolmogorov complexity of that object.
Why is Kolmogorov complexity language invariant? To see this intuitively, note that any universal
language can be used to encode any other universal programming language. This follows from the preceding
discussion because a programming language is just a particular kind of computable mapping, and any
universal programming language can encode any computable mapping. For example, consider two universal
computer languages which we call “C++” and “Java.” Starting with C++, we can write a program, known
in computer science as a compiler, which translates any program written in Java into C++. Suppose that
this program has length has length c1. Suppose that we know KJava(x), the length of the shortest program
which generates an object x in Java. What is KC++(x), the shortest program in C++ which encodes
x? Notice that one way of encoding x in C++ works as follows—the first part of the program translates
1Strictly, it is important that the program is a prefix program—that is, that no initial segment of the binary string comprising
the program itself defines a valid program; and, equally, that no non-trivial continuation of the binary string comprising the
program defines a valid program. The restriction to prefixes ensures that, for example, given a binary string that corresponds
to a concatenation of programs, there is no ambiguity concerning how the string should be divided into discrete programs.
Although tangential to the discussion here, the use of prefix complexity is of considerable technical importance [22, 52].
2Specifically, this constant is logn. All logarithms in this paper are binary logarithms unless otherwise noted.
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from Java into C++ (of length c1), and the second part of the program, which is an input to the first,
is simply the shortest Java program generating the object. The length of this program is the sum of the
lengths of its two components: KJava(x) + c1. This is a C++ program which generates x, if by a rather
roundabout means. Therefore KC++(x), the shortest possible C++ program must be no longer than this:
KC++(x) ≤ KJava(x) + c1. An exactly symmetric argument based on translating in the opposite direction
establishes that: KJava(x) ≤ KC++(x) + c2. Putting these results together, we see that KJava(x) and
KC++(x) are the same up to a constant, for all possible objects x. This is the Invariance Theorem that
Kolmogorov complexity is language invariant.
The implication of the Invariance Theorem is that the functions K(·) (and K(·|·), that we introduce
below) though defined in terms of a particular programming language, are language-independent up to an
additive constant and acquire an asymptotically universal and absolute character through the Church-Turing
thesis, from the ability of universal machines to simulate one another and execute any effective process. The
Kolmogorov complexity of a string can be viewed as an absolute and objective quantification of the amount
of information in it, giving a rigorous formal and most general notion corresponding to our intuitive notion
of shortest effective description length. This may be called Kolmogorov’s thesis. This leads to a theory of
absolute information contents of individual objects in contrast to classical information theory which deals
with average information to communicate objects produced by a random source. Since the former theory is
much more precise, it is perhaps surprising that analogs of many central theorems in classical information
theory nonetheless hold for Kolmogorov complexity, although in a somewhat weaker form.
We have mentioned that shortest code length is invariant for universal programming languages. How
restrictive is this? The constraint that a system of computation is universal turns out to be surprisingly
weak—all manner of computation systems, from a simple automaton with under 100 states supplied with
unlimited binary tape from which it can read and write, to numerous word processing packages, spreadsheet
and statistical packages, turn out to define universal programming languages. It seems that universality is
likely to be obeyed by a computational system as elaborate as that used involved in cognition.
The basic notion of Kolmogorov complexity has been elaborated into a rich mathematical theory, with
a wide range of applications in mathematics and computer science. It has also been applied in a range
of contexts in psychology, from perceptual organization (see [4, 20] for different uses of the theory), to
psychological judgements of randomness [12], to providing the basis for a theory of similarity [7]. Indeed, the
idea that cognition seeks the simplest explanation for the available data, inspired by results in Kolmogorov
complexity, has even been suggested as a fundamental principle of human cognition [5, 6].
2.2 Information distance
Kolmogorov complexity is defined for a single object, x. But an immediate generalization, conditional
Kolmogorov complexity, K(y|x) provides a measure of the degree to which an object y differs from another
object x. K(y|x) is defined as the length of the shortest program (in a universal programming language, as
before) that takes x as input, and produces y as output. The intuitive idea is that if items are distant from
each other, then it should require a complex program to turn one into the other. At this point it is useful to
recall the mathematical formulations of the notions of “distance” and “metric”:
A distance function D with nonnegative real values, defined on the Cartesian product X ×X of a set X
is called a metric on X if for every x, y, z ∈ X :
• D(x, y) = 0 iff x = y (the identity axiom);
• D(x, y) +D(y, z) ≥ D(x, z) (the triangle inequality);
• D(x, y) = D(y, x) (the symmetry axiom).
A set X provided with a metric is called a metric space. For example, every set X has the trivial discrete
metric D(x, y) = 0 if x = y and D(x, y) = 1 otherwise. All information distances in this paper are defined
on the set X = {0, 1}∗ (that is, the set of all finite strings composed of 0s and 1s) and satisfy the metric
conditions up to an additive constant or logarithmic term while the identity axiom can be obtained by
normalizing.
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The conditional complexity function K(y|x) trivially obeys identity, because no program at all is required
to transform an item into itself.3 Conditional complexity also obeys the triangle inequality: K(x|z) ≤
K(x|y) + K(y|z). This follows immediately from the observation that the concatenation of a program
mapping z into y (with minimum length K(y|z)), and a program mapping y into x is (with minimum length
K(x|y)). Using this concatenation, it is clearly possible to map x to z using a program of length no more
than the sum of these individual programs: K(x|y) +K(y|z). This sum must therefore be at least as great
as the length shortest program mapping from z to x, that is K(x|z), where K(x|z) is typically smaller by
there being shorter programs which perform this mapping without going through the intermediate stage of
generating y. Thus, the triangle inequality holds for K(·|·).
But, as it stands, K(y|x) is not appropriate as a distance measure, because it is asymmetric. Consider
the null string ǫ. K(ǫ|x) is small, for every x, because to map the input x onto the null string simply
involves deleting x, which is a simple operation. Conversely, K(x|ǫ) = K(x), which can have any value
whatever, depending on the complexity of x. Symmetry can be restored by, for example, taking the sum of
the complexities in both directions: K(x|y) +K(y|x), or alternatively, the maximum of both complexities
max{K(x|y),K(y|x)}. It is easy to verify that the resulting measures, known as sum distance and max
distance, respectively, qualify as distance metrics [2, 22]. For example, the sum distance and the max-
distance between x and the null string ǫ are given by K(x|ǫ) +K(ǫ|x) = K(x) = max{K(x|ǫ),K(ǫ|x)}.
Max and sum-distances are close but not necessarily equal. Denoting sum and max distance respectively
by Dsum and Dmax, it is easy to verify that, for every x, y:
Dmax(x, y) ≤ Dsum(x, y)) ≤ 2Dmax(x, y). (1)
For the present purpose of putting the Universal Law on a formal mathematical footing, it is important
to consider the epistimological motivation of these distances. The information distance is defined in [2] as the
length of a shortest binary program that computes x from y as well as computing y from x. Being shortest,
such a program should take advantage of any redundancy between the information required to go from x
to y and the information required to go from y to x. The program functions in a catalytic capacity in the
sense that it is required to transform the input into the output, but itself remains present and unchanged
throughout the computation. Note that while a program of lengthK(x|y)+K(y|x) by definition can compute
from y to x (a subprogram of length K(x|y)) and from x to y (a subprogram of length K(y|x)), it is by no
means clear (and happens to be false) that such a program is necessarily the shortest that performs both
the mapping from x to y and the mapping from y to x. A (K(x|y)+K(y|x))-length program is not minimal
if the information required to compute y from x can be made to overlap with that required to compute x
from y.
In some simple cases, complete overlap can be achieved, so that the same minimal program suffices to
compute x from y as to compute y from x. We first need an additional notion. A binary string x of n bits
is called incompressible if K(x) ≥ n. A simple argument suffices to show that the overwhelming majority
of strings is incompressible, [22]. We continue the main argument. For example if x and y are independent
incompressible binary strings of the same length n (up to additive constants we have K(x|y),K(y|x) ≥ n),
then their bitwise exclusive-or x⊕ y serves as a minimal program for both computations. (If x = 01011 and
y = 10001, then z = x ⊕ y = 11010. Since z ⊕ y = x and z ⊕ x = y we can use z as a program both to
compute from y to x and to compute from x to y.)
Similarly, if x = uv and y = vw where u, v, and w are independent incompressible strings of the same
length, then u⊕w along with a way to distinguish x from y is a minimal program to compute either string
from the other. Now suppose that more information is required for one of these computations than for the
other, say,
K(y|x) > K(x|y).
Then the minimal programs cannot be made identical because they must be of different sizes. In some cases
it is easy to see that the overlap can still be made complete, in the sense that the larger program (for y given
3Note that, throughout, due to language invariance, Kolmogorov complexities are only specified up to an additive constant.
So, in a particular language, K(x|x) could be non-zero—if, for example, some instructions are required to implement the ’null’
operation (this is typically true of real programming languages, in which the null string is not treated as a valid program. But
the length of this program will, by language invariance, be bounded by a constant, for all possible x.
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x) can be made to contain all the information in the shorter program, as well as some additional information.
This is so when x and y are independent incompressible strings of unequal length, for example u and vw
above. Then u⊕ v serves as a minimal program for u from vw, and (u ⊕ v)w serves as one for vw from u.
A principal result of [2] shows that, up to an additive logarithmic error term, the information required to
translate between two strings can be represented in this maximally overlapping way in every case. That is, the
minimal program to translate back and forth between x, y has length not larger than max{K(x|y),K(y|x)}.
It is straightforward that the minimum length program to do this back and forth translation cannot be
shorter, since by definition of Kolmogorov complexity the translation in direction x to y requires a program
of length at least K(y|x) and the translation in the direction of y to x requires a program of length at least
K(x|y). Therefore, the length of the shortest binary program that translates back and forth between two
items is called the information distance between the two items, and it is equal to Dmax(x, y)—to be precise,
up to an additive logarithmic term which we ignore in this discussion.
Max-distance has a particularly attractive universal quality: it is, in a sense, the minimal distance
measure, in a broad class of distance measures that might be termed “computable,” as we now see.
We say that a function from a discrete domain to the reals (for example a distance metric) is semicom-
putable from above if it can be approximated from above by some computable process. This is a very weak
condition. For example, it is weaker than the assumption that a function is computable. It requires merely
that there is some computable process that outputs a sequence of successive approximations to the function
value, that are successively decreasing, and which converge to be as close as desired to the distance metric,
given sufficient computation4. If we assume the Church-Turing thesis, that human cognition can encompass
only computable processes, then it seems that this assumption follows automatically.
To make sense of the notion of a “minimal” distance measure, we need some normalization condition,
to fix the “scale” of the distances. Without such a condition, we could simply divide the values given by a
distance metric by an arbitrarily large constant c to get a more “minimal” distance metric.
For a cognitive similarity metric the metric requirements do not suffice: a distance measure like D(x, y) =
1 for all x 6= y must be excluded. For each x and d, we want only finitely many elements y at a distance
d from x. Exactly how fast we want the distances of the strings y from x to go to ∞ is not important: it
is only a matter of scaling. In analogy with Hamming distance in the space of binary sequences, it seems
natural to require that there should not be more than 2d strings y at a distance d from x. This would be a
different requirement for each d. With prefix complexity, it turns out to be more convenient to replace this
double series of requirements (a different one for each x and d) with a single requirement for each x:
∑
y:y 6=x
2−D(x,y) < 1.
We call this the normalization property since a certain sum is required to be bounded by 1.
We consider only distances that are computable in some broad sense. This condition will not be seen as
unduly restrictive. As a matter of fact, only upper-semicomputability of D(x, y) will be required. This is
reasonable: as we have more and more time to process x and y we may discover more and more similarities
among them, and thus may revise our upper bound on their distance. The upper-semicomputability means
exactly that D(x, y) is the limit of a computable sequence of such upper bounds.
Definition 1 An admissible distance D(x, y) is a total nonnegative function on the pairs x, y of binary
strings that is 0 if and only if x = y, is symmetric, satisfies the triangle inequality, is upper-semicomputable
and normalized, that is, it is an upper-semicomputable, normalized, metric. An admissible distance D(x, y)
is universal if for every admissible distance D′(x, y) we have D(x, y) ≤ D′(x, y) + cD where cD may depend
on D but not on x or y.
In [2] a remarkable theorem shows that Dmax is a universal (that is, optimal) admissible distance. For-
mally, every admissible distance metric D has an associated constant c such that
Dmax(x, y) ≤ D(x, y) + c,
4It does not require, for example, that it is possible to actually output the “correct” distance values—or, indeed, to announce
the degree of approximation that has been achieved after a given amount of computation.
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for every x and y.
As already discussed above, the universal distance Dmax happens to also have a “physical” interpretation
as the approximate length of the the smallest binary program that transforms x into y and vice versa. That
is, for all the infinitely many x, y, and hence the infinite number of distances between them, the Dmax distance
is never more than a finite additive constant term greater than the corresponding D-distance with respect
to any admissible distance metric D, where the additive constant may depend on D but is independent of x
and y. 5
Intuitively, the significance of this is that the universal admissible distance minorizes all admissible
distances: if two pictures are d-close under some admissible distance, then they are d-close up to a fixed
additive constant under this universal admissible distance. That is, the latter discovers all effective feature
similarities or cognitive similarities between two objects: it is the universal cognitive similarity metric. The
remarkable thing about information distance measures such as Dmax is that, with respect to the class of
computable distance measures (subject to the normalization condition described above), they are minimal.
That is, if any computable measure treats two items as near, then information distance measures will also
treat the items as ‘reasonably’ near.
The typical distance measures considered in psychology, artificial intelligence or mathematics are not
universal. This is because they favor some regularities among the items that consider, but entirely ignore
other regularities—and some of these regularities may be the basis of computable (and hence allowable)
distance measures. Let us look at some examples. Identify digitized black-and-white pictures with binary
strings. There are many distances defined for binary strings. For example, the Hamming distance and the
Euclidean distance. The Hamming distance between two n-bit vectors is the number of positions containing
different bits; the Euclidean distance between two n-bit vectors is the square root of the Hamming distance.
Such distances are sometimes appropriate. For instance, if we take a binary picture, and change a few bits
on that picture, then the changed and unchanged pictures have small Hamming or Euclidean distance, and
they do look similar. However, this is not always the case. The positive and negative prints of a photo
have the largest possible Hamming and binary Euclidean distance, yet they look similar to us. Also, if we
shift a picture one bit to the right, again the Hamming distance may increase by a lot, but the two pictures
remain similar. As another example, a metric of similarity based on comparing overlap of features [50] will
treat items that have precisely opposite patterns of features as very distant. But, of course, with respect to
the Dmax measure such items are very close since the program saying ”take the opposite of every feature”
suffices to change one item into the other. Hence, such a feature-based metric is not a minimal distance.
Similarly, if items are represented as real-valued vectors, and the Euclidean distance metric is used, then
items corresponding to vectors v and 2v will have distance equal to the Euclidean length of v, while Dmax
is small.
We believe that, in the present context, the minimality of information distance is a substantial virtue,
because minimal distance measures make the least commitment to the specific similarity metric used by
the cognitive system—because they approximate all possible (computable) metrics. Thus, minimal distance
measures seem the ideal candidate “null hypotheses” about the structure of psychological similarity.
We have considered some technical reasons why measures based on information distance are attractive
general distance measures. These measures gain some additional psychological interest because of its rela-
tion to the recently proposed Representational Distortion theory of psychological similarity [7]. According
to Representation Distortion, the psychological similarity of two items depends on the complexity of the
transformation required to “distort” the representation of one of the items into a representation of the other
item. The notion of complexity is then assumed to be related to the notion of conditional Kolmogorov
complexity, as described here. According to this viewpoint, the flexibility of measures like information dis-
tance is appropriate because it reflects the flexibility of the cognitive system—to choose arbitrary ways of
interrelating, aligning and connecting representations, rather than being constrained to use a fixed similarity
measure. This account of similarity, although early in its development, has received some empirical support
[19].
5By (1) Dsum(x, y) ≤ 2D(x, y)+2c, because the two measures Dmax and Dsum are within a constant factor 2 of each other.
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2.3 How Items are Confused
We assume a very general, and weak, model of similarity—based on information distance. We next need a
general model of the how items are confused with each other. Fortunately, only a very weak assumption is
required. First, we assume that there is a discrete set of items a, stimuli Sa, and responses Ra. Moreover,
these are associated with one another in the sense that there is a fixed program that on input x computes
y where x and y are choosen from among of a, Sa, Ra. Secondly, for each stimulus a, the probability
distribution Pr(Rb|Sa) over the different responses, b, is itself semicomputable from below. That is, it can
be approximated from below by a computable process that produces a monotonically increasing series of
approximations to Pr(Rb|Sa) which approach arbitrarily closely, given sufficient computing time. This is a
weaker condition, of course, than the condition that the probability distribution can be actually be computed
exactly by some computable process—which is equivalent to the distribution being both semicomputable from
above and from below. Recall that the celebrated Church-Turing Thesis, see for example [37], states that
everything which is intuitively computable can be computed formally by a Turing machine, or, equivalently,
a standard computer supplied with a large anough memory. Assuming the Church-Turing thesis implies that
processes executed by the cognitive system are computable functions. In particular, therefore, this condition
will include any computational account of the process by which stimuli Sa are mapped onto responses Rb.
3 The General Universal Law of Generalization
Having outlined the notion of information distance, and provided a weak condition on the cognitive pro-
cesses by which confusability between items occurs, we are now in a position to show how the generalized
“algorithmic” version of the Universal Law can be derived from first principles.
The idea behind the proof is to place bounds on the confusability probabilities, Pr(Rb|Sa), simply in
virtue of its semicomputability, using basic results of Kolmogorov complexity theory. These bounds can be
interpreted as providing a direct connection between confusability and the measure of information distance.
We use standard results from Kolmogorov complexity theory, which provide the bounds on Pr(Rb|Sa) that
we require.
3.1 Optimal Codes and Entropy
For technical reasons we recall some notions from information theory [9]. Suppose we have a random source
emitting letters from the alphabet with certain frequencies. Our task is to encode messages consisting of
many letters in binary in such a way that on average the encoded message is as short as possible. It is evident
that by assigning the few shortest binary sequences to the most common letters and the longer sequences to
the rare ones, the expected length of a message is less than if we assigned equal length codes to all letters.
Thus, the Morse code in telegraphy is adapted to the frequency of letter occurrences in English. It assigns
short sequences of dots and dashes to more frequently occurring letters: “a” is encoded as ”. -” and “t” is
encoded as “-”. Long sequences of dots and dashes are assigned to less frequently occurring letters such as
“z” which is encoded as “- - . .”. A prefix code has the property that no code word starts with another code
word as proper initial segment (prefix). This property makes it possible to parse an encoded message into
the sequence of code words from which it is composed in only one way: We can unambiguously retrieve the
encoded message. Note that the Morse code is not a prefix-code. A prefix code for the letters a,b, . . . ,z is,
for example, to encode “a” by “.-”, the letter “b” by “..-”, and so on. This example is not very efficient;
it is essentially a tally code. It is easy to design more efficient prefix-codes. Nonetheless, since prefixes
are excluded, it is clear that prefix-codes cannot be as concise as general codes. But prefix-codes have a
very general and central property that makes them more practical than other codes: for every code that is
uniquely decodable there is a prefix-code that has precisely the same lengths of code words. Thus, when we
want unambiguous codes then we can as well restrict ourselves to prefix-codes: they are uniquely decodable
and have the additional advantage that we can parse them in one pass going left-to-right. Moreover, it is
well-known that there is a tight connection between prefix codes, probabilities, and notions of optimal codes:
Call the letters to be encoded by the name “source words”. Consider an ensemble of source letters with
source word x having probability P (x). Assign code words with code word length lP (x) to source word
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x. The so-called Noiseless Coding Theorem of C. Shannon states that among all prefix codes the minimal
average code word length, the average taken with respect to the distribution P , satisfies
H(P ) ≤
∑
x
P (x)lP (x) ≤ H(P ) + 1
where H(P ) = −
∑
x P (x) logP (x) is called the entropy of P . This minimum is reached by the so-called
Shannon-Fano code (the details of which do not matter here) where we assign a code word of length
−⌈logP (x)⌉ to source word x. Intuitively, this code is optimally “adapted” to the probability distribu-
tion P of the source words.
3.2 The Kolmogorov Code
A trivial application of this result, generalized to conditional probability, is that using a code that is well-
adapted to probability distribution Pr(·|Sa), the Shannon-Fano code length ofRb, given Sa, is− log Pr(Rb|Sa).
This allows us to quantify the code length of a particular way of mapping Sa onto Rb. First, specify the
probability distribution Pr—this can be done using a computer program of length K(Pr) (the existence of
such a computer program is guaranteed by the condition that Pr is computable). Then specify Rb, given
Sa using the probability distribution Pr, which takes length − log Pr(Rb|Sa) using the Shannon-Fano code.
Thus, the total length of this way of mapping from Sa to Rb is: K(Pr) − log Pr(Rb|Sa). Obviously, every
computable code that maps Sa to Rb must be at least as long as the shortest computable code which does
this, which length is, by definition, K(Rb|Sa). Thus, we can infer that:
K(Rb|Sa) ≤ K(Pr)− log Pr(Rb|Sa),
which, when rearranged, provides an upper bound on Pr(Rb|Sa):
Pr(Rb|Sa) ≤ 2
K(Pr)−K(Rb|Sa).
In the following it is convenient to use a special notation for (in)equality up to an additive constant.
From now on, we will denote by
+
< an inequality to within an additive constant, and by
+
= the situation when
both
+
< and
+
> hold.
We derive a lower bound: Suppose we sample from a distribution Pr, and encode the outcomes using an
optimally adapted code, as described above. We can then write down the expected code length as
EPr(− log Pr(x))
+
=
∑
x
Pr(x)(− log Pr(x))
+
= −
∑
x
Pr(x) log Pr(x).
Here EPrf(x) = −
∑
x Pr(x)f(x) is called the expectation of f(x) with respect to Pr. With f(x) =
− logPr(x) this is the above expression for the entropy of Pr. Now suppose that we consider, instead, the
expected value of the Kolmogorov complexity of x—the shortest code length for x, in a universal programming
language. In general, of course, this will be at least as great as the entropy—because the entropy reflects
the shortest expected code length for x, using a code which is optimally adapted to Pr. So this means that
EPr(− log Pr(x)) ≤ EPrK(x).
Nonetheless, though, there will typically be individual values of x for which Kolmogorov complexity is
significantly less than the code length (≈ − log Pr(x)) optimized to Pr. For example, suppose that Pr is an
extremely simple distribution over binary strings, such that 0 and 1 values both have a probabilty of .5, and
are independent—as if, for example, the string were generated by a series of fair coin flips. Consider the
string that consists of a million consecutive 1s. According to Pr, the probability of this string is 2−1,000,000,
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and the code length according to the code optimally adapted to Pr is − log 2−1,000,000 = 1, 000, 000. Indeed,
this same code length will be assigned for every binary string of 1, 000, 000 characters generated by Pr,
because according to Pr all such strings have the same probability of occurring. However, the Kolmogorov
complexity of this particular string will, of course, be considerably less than 1, 000, 000 bits—because a short
computer program can print a million 1s and then halt.
The reason that this particular string generated by Pr has a smaller Kolmogorov complexity that is
associated with the optimal code for Pr, is that the string has some additional structure, that is unexplained
by Pr. The existence of this additional structure (such as being a sequence of repeated items, or alternating
items, or encoding π = 3.14 . . . in binary, or whatever it may be) can therefore be used to provide an
unexpectedly short code for the string. Intuitively, though, it seems that strings generated by Pr with
such additional useful structure must be rare—it would seem likely that the overwhelming majority of
strings generated by Pr will merely be typical of the distribution, and hence will not contain any useful
“unexpected” structure. The Kolmogorov complexity of these items will, therefore, be at least as great as
the code length according to the code optimally adapted to Pr. This intuition is indeed correct. It can be
shown that the probability that an item, x, drawn from Pr, is such that
− log Pr(x) ≤ K(x)
goes to 1 for length of x grows unboundedly [22, 52]. That is, almost all probability is concentrated
on items x satisfying this inequality—and if the probability is not dramatically skewed this implies that
the overwhelming majority of x’s do so. Items for which this inequality holds are known as Pr(·)-random,
indicating that they do not have sufficient ’unexpected’ structure to support an shorter coding than would
be expected from Pr6.
A straightforward generalization of this result to conditional probability, and its application in the present
context yields the result that, for the Rb that are Pr(.|Sa)-random (and the probability of sampling such an
item from Pr(·|Sa) will be almost 1), then
− logPr(Rb|Sa) ≤ K(Rb|Sa).
This equation can be rearranged to give a lower bound on Pr(Rb|Sa):
2−K(Rb|Sa) ≤ Pr(Rb|Sa)
Putting the upper and lower bounds together, we can conclude that, for Pr(·|Sa)-random items:
2−K(Rb|Sa) ≤ Pr(Rb|Sa) ≤ 2
K(Pr)−K(Rb|Sa).
This result implies that, for allmost all items (the Pr(·|Sa)-random items), Pr(Rb|Sa) is close to 2
−K(Rb|Sa),
to within a multiplicative factor, 2K(Pr). Since K(Pr) is constant, independent of the items a and b we can
simplify the formulas, using the earlier introduced notation “
+
=”, to
log Pr(Rb|Sa)
+
= −K(Rb|Sa), (2)
for allmost all items b (the Pr(·|Sa)-random items) with respect to every item a. That is, for almost all pairs
of items a, b with Pr(·|a)-probability going to 1 for b increasing with every fixed a.
6Here, we touch on the more general idea that the randomness of a string may be assessed by considering its Kolmogorov
complexity. This idea has been developed into a deep mathematical theory of ’algorithmic’ randomness. The common meaning
of a “random object” is an outcome of a random source. Such outcomes have expected properties but particular outcomes
may or may not possess these expected properties. In contrast, we use the notion of randomness of individual objects. This
elusive notion’s long history goes back to the initial attempts by von Mises, [29], to formulate the principles of application of the
calculus of probabilities to real-world phenomena. Classical probability theory cannot even express the notion of “randomness
of individual objects.” Following almost half a century of unsuccessful attempts, the theory of Kolmogorov complexity, [21],
and Martin-Lo¨f tests for randomness, [24], finally succeeded in formally expressing the novel notion of individual randomness
in a correct manner, see [22]. Every individually random object possesses individually all effectively testable properties that
are only expected for outcomes of the random source concerned. It will satisfy all effective tests for randomness— known and
unknown alike. Details are beyond the scope of this treatment, but see the discussions in [24, 22].
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3.3 Formal Derivation of the Law
Now we are in a position to directly relate Shepard’s Universal Law to information distance. Shepard uses
a specific measure, G(a, b), as a measure of what he terms the ‘generalization’ between items a and b. Here
Sa is the stimulus related to item a with the correct corresponding response Ra. Possibly, the stimulus Sa
elicits another response Rb (b 6= a). The probability of this happening is Pr(Rb|Sa).
G(a, b) =
[
Pr(Ra|Sb)Pr(Rb|Sa)
Pr(Ra|Sa)Pr(Rb|Sb)
] 1
2
(3)
To express G(a, b) in terms of Kolmogorov complexity observe the following. We have assumed at the
outset that there is a simple fixed program, of length say C bits, that maps Sx to Rx for all x’s. This means
that K(Ra|Sa) and K(Rb|Sb) are upper bounded by a fixed constant C independent of variable items a and
b. Moreover, K(Ra|Sa) and K(Rb|Sb) are strictly positive as a consequence of the definition of Kolmogorov
complexity (the Universal Turing Machine must have some program to do the transformation). Therefore,
the denominator in (3) can be replaced by a positive constant independent of a and b. Taking this into
account, and substituting (2) into (3) we obtain that, for almost all a, b (the almost all Pr(·|Sa)-random
items b with respect to every item a in the above sense of concentration of Pr-probability),
logG(a, b)
+
=
1
2
[−K(Ra|Sb)−K(Rb|Sa)] . (4)
We have also assumed at the outset that there are fixed length programs that computes Sa from a, Ra
from a, Sa from Ra, and so on, for every item a. Therefore, K(Rb|Sa)
+
= K(b|a) and K(Ra|Sb)
+
= K(a|b).
Earlier, we defined the “sum”-information distance Dsum(a, b) between a and b as the sum K(b|a)+K(b|a) of
the conditional complexities between the two items. Therefore, Dsum(a, b) = K(b|a)+K(a|b)
+
= K(Rb|Sa)+
K(Ra|Sb), which can be substituted into (4) to give:
logG(a, b)
+
= −
1
2
Dsum(a, b)
or equivalently, shifting to base e,
lnG(a, b)
+
= −
ln 2
2
Dsum(a, b), (5)
for almost all a and b (in the above sense of concentration of Pr-probability).
This means that G(a, b) is a negative exponential function of information distance Dsum, which is Shep-
ard’s Universal Law. This is a surprising result. It indicates that G(a, b), a measure of the confusability
between the items a and b, has a specific functional relationship with a general measure of distance, subject
only to the mild assumption that the probability distribution determining confusability is computable.
Two points concerning this result are worth noting. The first is that it might appear that the result is
somewhat too precise. Shepard’s Universal Law allows two free parameters, A and B:
G(a, b) = Ae−B·D(a,b)
whereas (5) has no apparent free parameters. But this disparity is deceptive: The
+
=-symbol hides the
parameter A, because it gives equality—but only up to an additive constant term (which translates into an
multiplicative constant factor since (5) gives the logarithmic version of the relation). Moreover, the units
for Dsum are arbitrary, because they depend on the choice of a binary alphabet for measuring Kolmogorov
complexity. Shifting to an alphabet with a different number of elements (which can be viewed as having any
real value), values of Dsum will change by a multiplicative constant, which can be interpreted as parameter
B.
Moreover, of course, our generalization of the universal law of generalization doesn’t hold for all items a
and b but for almost all items a and b (in the sense of concentration of Pr-probability).
The second point is that it might appear that the outcome of this result provides some reason to prefer
Dsum overDmax as a preferred measure of information distance in psychological contexts. But note that they
give the same values up to a multiplicative factor 2, since we have noted above (1) that Dmax ≤ Dsum ≤
2Dmax. But even so, this apparent preference between the two measures is merely a consequence of the
specific way in which Shepard defined G.
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3.4 Improved Universal Law of Generalization
It turns out that there are mathematical reasons to choose a slightly different measure of the confusability
between items a, b than initially chosen by Shepard. Define a new measure of confusability as
G′(a, b) =
min{Pr(Rb|Sa),Pr(Ra|Sb)}
max{Pr(Ra|Sa),Pr(Rb|Sb)}
,
where we consider the ratio of (i) to (ii), such that (i) is the minimum of the two probabilities that the stimulus
for a elicits the response for b or the stimulus for b elicits the response for a, and (ii) is the maximum of
the two probabilities that the stimulus for a elicits the response for a and the stimulus for b elicits the
response for b. then analogous analysis to that above leads to a similar result. Viz., from the earlier analysis
argument we have − log Pr(Rb|Sa)
+
= K(b|a) (by noting K(Pr)
+
= 0). And moreover K(b|a)
+
= 0 for b = a
so that the precise form of the denominator—whether min, max, square root of product—doesn’t matter
since it will be a constant independent of a and b. The important part of the formula is the nominator:
note that the minimum for the conditional probabilities in the formula translates into the maximum for
the related conditional Kolmogorov complexities. Thus, for almost all a, b, in the sense of concentration of
Pr-probability, we obtain logG′(a, b)
+
= −Dmax(a, b) and therefore
lnG′(a, b)
+
= −(ln 2)Dmax(a, b)
Straightforward substitution of the log-expressions of G and G′ in the relation (1) yields − logG′(a, b)
+
<
−2 logG(a, b)
+
< −2 logG′(a, b). That is, there are positive constants C1, C2 independent of a, b such that
G′(a, b) ≤ C1G(a, b) ≤ C2
√
G′(a, b).
for almost all a, b, in the sense of concentration of Pr-probability. 7 It seems likely that the two measures
G′(a, b) and G(a, b) will be so strongly positively correlated, in the empirical data, that the empirical fits
derived by Shepard for the Universal law using “G” would be roughly equally strong using “G′”, although
we do not assess this directly.
There is a formal reason to prefer the G′(a, b)-version as the proper measure of confusability over the
G(a, b) version, since it appeared above that the negative logarithm of the G′(a, b) is precisely (up to the
+
= relation) the information distance Dmax(a, b). As we observed above, the latter has been shown in [2]
to be the universal (that is optimal) cognitive distance. Viewing a cognitive distance D as defined in [2]
as a code-length this means the following: If we fix b and let a run over the possible items then define the
probability P (a|b) of a given b by P (a|b) = 2−D(a,b).
It was shown in the cited reference that
∑
a:a 6=b 2
−D(a,b) ≤ 1 so that P (a|b) is a proper probability. In
fact, the cognitive distance code of length D(a, b), the shortest binary program that serves to compute a from
b and also to compute b from a, is length-equivalent to the Shannon-Fano code associated with P (a|b) and
hence achieves the optimal (minimal) expected code word length (the entropy of P by Shannon’s Noiseless
Coding Theorem, [9]) among all prefix-codes.
Now lets go to the punch line: Since Dmax(a, b) is the minimal cognitive distance, minorizing all other
cognitive distances, up to a constant additive term, its associated probability distribution PG′(a|b) :=
G′(a, b) = 2−Dmax(a,b), with b fixed, majorizes, up to a constant multiplicative factor, every probability
distribution PD(a|b) = 2
−D(a,b) with D(a, b) a cognitive distance.
That is, if we fix b and consider the probability of confusing any item a with item b, according to some
semi-computable cognitive similarity criterion, as the negative exponent of the cognitive distance according
to that similarity criterion, then the confusion measure G′(a, b) is the largest such probability incorporating
confusability according to all semi-computable (including all computable) cognitive similarity criteria.
7Note that
√
G′(a, b) > G′(a, b) since 0 < G′(a, b) < 1.
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4 Discussion
We have shown that Shepard’s Univeral Law of generalization follows, if we assume that psychological
distance is modelled as information distance. We have also indicated that information distance is a highly
general notion of distance, which may be of broader psychological interest.
How does the derivation presented here relate to other formal work which are described as providing
derivations for the Universal Law of generalisation, by Shepard [43] and Tenenbaum & Griffiths [48]? These
other derivation are, in fact, not directly related, because these other derivations are concerned with a
different and much harder question: Why do items that are close in psychological distance tend to have
similar properties? This issue concerns the question of generalization proper–whereas the evidence that
Shepard gathers concerns the confusability between items.
Thus, we have here addressed the specific relationship evident in the data that [43] encapsulates as the
Universal Law. But an interesting open question is whether the notion of information distance can be used
to address the question of generalization, as tackled by Shepard’s and Tenenbaum & Griffith’s results. Given
the rich mathematical connections between the theory of Kolmogorov complexity and inductive inference
and statistics (e.g., Rissanen, [38, 39, 40]; Solomonoff, [45, 46]; Wallace [53, 54]), it may be hoped some
relationship between information distance and generalization might be established.
Finally, we note that the generalization of the Universal Law that we have outlined in this paper is
attractive, because it applies in such a general setting. Specifically, it does not presuppose that items
correspond to points in an internal multidimensional psychological space. This result suggests a further
line of empirical research, to determine whether the Universal law does indeed hold in these more general
circumstances. Such research might investigate whether the Universal Law still holds, as we would predict,
even for stimuli, such as complex visual or linguistic material, that seems unlikely to embed naturally into a
multidimensional psychological space. We hope that the present paper will serve as a stimulus to empirical
research of this kind.
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